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District courts in most circuits face a problem: does the socalled "complete preemption" doctrine apply to the Copyright
Act-that is, does the complete preemption doctrine allow a
defendant to remove a case that states only state law claims from
state court to federal court if the Copyright Act seems to cover
the subject matter of the claims? This Article proposes that
courts and practitioners need to start arguing the merits of both
the complete preemption doctrine and the tests that apply to the
doctrine-the congressional intent test, the exclusive federal
cause of action test, and the extra element test.
Commentators and courts disagree on the merits of using the
complete preemption doctrine in context of the Copyright Act.
Plaintiffs prefer state courts, and defendants prefer federal courts.
Therefore, defendants often remove cases to federal courts, and
plaintiffs move to remand cases to state courts. In cases that
involve copyrights, sometimes plaintiffs file cases in state courts
and omit claims of copyright infringement to avoid federal court
jurisdiction, while defendants increasingly assert that causes of
action of breach of contract claims and other claims that involve
copyrights relate to the Copyright Act. Thus, the complete
preemption doctrine allows the defendant to remove the case to
federal court. The competing views of commentators and courts
inform plaintiffs and defendants sufficiently to allow them to
argue the merits of each step of the analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION

In three situations, a defendant in a state court may transfer the lawsuit to a
federal court. When a plaintiff files a lawsuit in state court that presents a
question of federal law or involves parties who reside in different states, the
defendant may file a notice of removal in the state court and another notice of
removal in-a federal court to transfer the case from the state court to the federal
court., In a third situation, if a plaintiff files a lawsuit in state court that
presents a question of state law and neither presents a question of federal law
nor involves parties who reside in different states, the doctrine of "complete
preemption" allows the defendant to transfer the case to a federal court, if a
federal statute completely encompasses the subject matter of the state law.2
1 28

U.S.C. 5 1441(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2006).
See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)
(applying the complete preemption doctrine); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)
2
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The federal courts do not agree on whether the doctrine of complete
preemption applies to the Copyright Act-that is, whether the Copyright Act so
completely covers the field of copyright law that a defendant may remove a
lawsuit that presents questions of state law that involve copyright-protected
material.3 The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits
have held that the Copyright Act (the Act)4 completely blankets the field of
copyright law.s Thus, in these circuits, the doctrine of complete preemption
allows a defendant to remove a case from a state court to a federal court if the
plaintiff presents a question of state law that the Copyright Act covers. 6 The
Third Circuit has held that the Copyright Act does not completely blanket the
field of copyright law.7 In the remaining circuits, a problem faces the district
courts: should the doctrine of complete preemption apply to the Copyright Act
to allow defendants to transfer cases from state court to federal court?8
Part I of this Article addresses the battle that ensues when defendants try to
transfer a case from state court to federal courts. It also discusses that plaintiffs
tend to prefer state court and addresses the reasons that motivate plaintiffs to
file cases in state court. Part I also addresses defendants' preference for federal
courts as well as the factors that animate this preference. Defendants often try
to transfer lawsuits from state court to federal court, and the considerations that
these defendants must take into account are discussed.9 Similarly, a plaintiff
usually attempts to return a case to state court if the defendant successfully

(same); Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (same).
3 See, e.g., Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding complete preemption
doctrine applies to the Copyright Act); Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Tombs, 215 F. App'x 80 (3d
Cit. 2006) (finding complete preemption doctrine does not apply to the Copyright Act).
4 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
5 Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cit. 2004); Rosciszewski v. Arete
Assocs., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cit. 1993); Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
6 See, e.g., Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 309 (finding that the complete preemption doctrine applies to
the Copyright Act and denying motion to remand).
7 Tombs, 215 F. App'x at 82.
8 See, e.g., Black v. Kos, No. CIV 05-163, 2005 WL 4564587, at *1 (D.N.M. Mar. 29, 2005)
(holding complete preemption doctrine does not apply to the Copyright Act); Crooks v. Certified
Computer Consultants, 92 F. Supp. 2d 582, 587 (W.D. La. 2000) (finding that the complete
preemption doctrine does not apply to the Copyright Act); Am. Airlines v. Biztraveldeals.com,
No. 4:08-CV-069-A, 2008 WL 818536, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008) (holding that the
complete preemption does not apply to the Copyright Act); W. States Pathology, Inc. v.
Ruffdogs, Inc., No. 06-cv-02473-PSF-MJW, 2007 WL 196839, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 19, 2007)
(applying the complete preemption doctrine to the Copyright Act); Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F.
Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that the complete preemption applies to the
Copyright Act).
9 Casey Tourtillott & Matt Corbin, A Pratitioner'sRoad Map to Removal and Remand in Kansas
Courts, 76 J. KAN. B.A., no. 9, Oct. 2007, at 22.
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transferred the case to federal court, and the battle that ensues between the
plaintiff and defendant is addressed.10
Part II addresses the field of battle in a growing number of cases: whether
the Copyright Act so completely covers the subject matter of the questions of
state law in a lawsuit that the doctrine of complete preemption allows the
defendant to transfer the lawsuit to federal court. The doctrine of complete
preemption and the difference between complete preemption and the defense
of ordinary preemption are explained.11 Part II then illustrates the arguments of
scholars and courts in favor and against the doctrine of complete preemption.12
Although the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act,13 the Labor Management Relations Act,14 and
the National Bank Act;15 and some circuit courts have extended the doctrine to
the other statutes, 16 including the Copyright Act,17 many scholars criticize the
doctrine as a whole and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.18

Thus, in

most circuit courts, judges must decide whether to apply the controversial
doctrine to the Copyright Act. Part II sets out the arguments in favor and
against the doctrine in the copyright context.
The Ninth Circuit has not decided whether the doctrine applies to the
Copyright Act.19 However, recently, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Southern California decided a case that demonstrates the
20
complexity of the complete preemption doctrine in the copyright context.
NTD Architects, an architectural firm in San Diego, sued two former employee

10 Id.

1114B

CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §3722.2 (4th ed. 2012).
12 See, e.g., Gil Seinfeld, The Puj le of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 537 (2007); Paul E.
McGreal, In Defense of Complete Preempion, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 147 (2007).
13 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987).
14 Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390
U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
15 Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2003).
16 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that the
complete preemption doctrine extends to the Federal Aviation Act); Bastien v. AT&T Wireless
Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the complete preemption doctrine applies
to the Federal Communications Act).
17 See, e.g., Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding
that the complete preemption doctrine extends to the Copyright Act).
Is See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Complete Preempton and the Separadon of Powers, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. PENNUMBRA 186 (2007).
19 Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 993 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("[Inhere is no Ninth Circuit authority
on point.").
20 NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB-JMA, 2012 WL 2498868 (S.D. Cal. June 27,
2012).
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architects in San Diego Superior Court and asserted eight state law claims,
including misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.21
The architects, Jon Baker and Richard Nowicki, removed the case to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California, and NTD
Architects filed a motion to remand the lawsuit to the San Diego Superior
Court on the grounds that the Southern District of California did not have
jurisdiction.22
Baker and Nowicki opposed the motion to remand on the grounds that the
Copyright Act completely preempted the state law claims because the Copyright
Act broadly covered the field of copyright law and the claims concerned
copyright-protected material, such as computer files.23 The Southern District of
California agreed with arguments of Baker and Nowicki and concluded that the
doctrine of complete preemption applied to the Copyright Act.24 The court
decided that the Copyright Act preempted the conversion claim and therefore
that Baker and Nowicki properly removed the lawsuit.25
Part IV of this Article examines the decision of the Southern District of
California. Some scholars dislike the doctrine of complete preemption because
it increases the caseload of federal courts. 26 Part IV examines whether the court
adequately considered this argument and other arguments. The court ultimately
decided that the doctrine rests on solid footing and assessed whether to apply
the doctrine to the Copyright Act.27 Courts use one of two tests to decide
whether to extend the doctrine to the Copyright Act: the older "congressional
intent" test 28 or the newer "exclusive federal cause of action" test.29
In this case, the court examined whether Congress intended the Copyright
Act to cover copyright law so broadly that the Act would preempt similar

21

22

Id. at *1.
Id.at *1-2.

23 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Remand to State Court Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1147(c), NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB-JMA (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012).
24 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *4-6.
25 Id. at *8.
26 E.g., Eric James Moss, The Breadth of Complete Preemption: Limiting the Doctine to its Roots, 76
VA. L. REV. 1601, 1638 (1990).
27 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *4.
2 See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cit. 1993) ("[f]n deciding
whether the preemptive force of the Copyright Act is so extraordinary that a state-law
claim ... becomes federal in nature, the focus of our inquiry must be congressional intent.").
29 See, e.g., Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
that the complete preemption doctrine extends "to any federal statute that both preempts state
law and substitutes a federal remedy for that law, thereby creating an exclusive federal cause of
action").
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causes of action under state law, allowing defendants to remove cases to federal
court.30 The Court found that Congress expressed this kind of intent in two
provisions.31 Part IV assesses whether the court correctly decided to use the
older congressional intent test and the effect of this decision on the evolution
of the complete preemption doctrine. Part IV also evaluates whether Congress
intended the Copyright Act to play the role of a completely preemptive statute.
Finally, Part IV addresses whether the court correctly decided that the
Copyright Act completely preempted the conversion claim.
The court's opinion leaves many other questions unanswered, and Part V
address these questions. The court decided that the Copyright Act did not
completely preempt the other seven claims;32 it did not, however, provide a
detailed explanation for this decision.33 Why did the court find that the
Copyright Act does not completely preempt a misappropriation of trade secrets
claim?34 Why did the court find that the Act does not completely preempt a
breach of fiduciary duty claim?5 Part V assesses these and other questions in
light of the competing arguments of.scholars and other courts and attempts to
provide guidance to practitioners.
II. WHY PRACTITIONERS BATTLE OVER FORUM: PLAINTIFFS PREFER STATE
COURT, AND DEFENDANTS PREFER FEDERAL COURT

Plaintiffs and defendants prefer different courts. Plaintiffs counsel usually
feels more comfortable with state court procedures.36 Defendant's counsel
often believes that federal courts have more expertise in federal copyright law.37
Thus, defense lawyers often try to remove the case to a federal court and must
consider several factors. The plaintiffs lawyer then usually attempts to remand
the case to state court.

30
31
32

NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *5-6.
Id
Id. at *8.

Id
34 Id. (finding misappropriation of trade secrets claim "not preempted by the Copyright Act").
33

See id. (finding breach of fiduciary duty claim "not preempted by the Copyright Act").
Tourtillott & Corbin, supra note 9, at 22; Howard B. Stravitz, Recocking the Removal Trigger, 53
S.C. L. REv. 185, 185 (2002).
37 See Deborah Pearce Reggio, Removal and Remand: A Guide to Navigating Between the State and
FederalCourts, 23 Miss. C. L. REv. 97, 97-99 (2004) (observing that removal "ensures that the
better-informed tribunal adjudicates questions of federal law.. . . While fear of local prejudice and
the notion that state judges are not competent to adjudicate federal questions originally drove
defendants to remove cases, in modern times, removal is driven more by strategic concerns.").
3s

36
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Practitioners who handle cases that involve copyright-protected material
know that "the stakes involved in removal are high."38 In federal court cases
that involve copyright law, the "Copyright Act permits attorney's fees to be
awarded to the prevailing party."39
A. PLAINTIFFS PREFER STATE COURT

Plaintiffs' lawyers prefer state courts to federal courts for several reasons.
They usually feel more competent in state court procedure.4
Also, they
sometimes believe that federal judges express apathy toward plaintiffs.41 Many
lawyers assert that federal courts favor defendants, especially as federal expert
witness rules tend to weigh in a defendant's favor.42 If a plaintiffs lawyer
believes that the defendant may attempt to remove a case in state court to a
federal court, then the lawyer normally files the suit in a state court in a federal
district that tends to interpret the removal rules in favor of the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, many cases that involve copyright-protected material present
questions of federal law.43 Consequently, "for strategic reasons, occasionally
plaintiffs bring state law causes of action in state court that, in reality, arise
exclusively under the Copyright Act, in an attempt to keep the case out of
federal court.""
B. DEFENDANTS PREFER FEDERAL COURT

In cases that involve copyrights and other cases, defendants prefer federal
courts for several reasons. Sometimes out-of-state defendants remove cases to
federal courts because they fear that the state court clings to bias in favor of
local citizens.45 Further, defendants often remove cases to federal courts to
counteract all of the above-mentioned factors that cause plaintiffs to file

38 RAYMOND J. DowD, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 10:2 (2009).

39 Id.
4

Tourtillott & Corbin, supra note 9, at 22; Stravitz, supra note 36, at 185.

41 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really RevealAnything About the

Legal System? Win Rates and RemovalJurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 601 (1998).
42 Thomas A. Mauet, The New World of Experts in Federal and State Courts, 25 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC., no. 2, Fall 2011, at 234-35; Heather R. Barber, . Removal and Remand, 37 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1555, 1555 (2004).
43 DOWD, supra note 38; see, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 229-33 (4th Cir.
1993) (involving copyright protected computer program).
4 5 WILLiAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 5 17:23 (2012).
45 Tourtillott & Corbin, supra note 9, at 22.
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lawsuits in state court. 46 Indeed, defendants regularly remove cases to take the
plaintiff to the less familiar forum of federal court. 47
Defendants also feel that federal judges are better informed;48 specifically,
defendants value federal court judges' expertise in cases that present questions
of federal law.49 Furthermore, some lawyers believe that federal courts favor
defendants' motions for summary judgment more than plaintiffs'.o
C. NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT

Although federal courts provide several advantages to defendants,
defendants must consider several factors when evaluating whether to remove a
Deborah Pearce Reggio has outlined these
case to federal court.51
considerations.52
First, defendants must consider the jury.53 Specifically, defendants must
consider "the geographic scope of the pools, the number of jurors required to
reach a verdict, and the rules governing jury demand in each forum."54 Second,
defendants must consider the rules of civil procedure.55 Defendants must
evaluate their "familiarity with the respective procedural rules, the time frame
and production requirements of each court, each court's general treatment of
motion practice, and the various disclosure and discovery rules."6 Third,
defendants must consider the judge.57 Specifically, defendants must consider
the caseloads of the available judges, the familiarity of the judges with files, the
circumstances of the appointments of judges, and the rules that govern the
removal of judges; these factors impact the advantages of the assigned judgeS

46 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 598 (finding that removal lowers the win rate of
the plaintiff).
47 See id. at 599 (observing that removal "dislodg[es]" the plaintiff from a familiar forum and
"revers[es] the ... differences in procedural law that led the plaintiff to prefer state court").
48 Reggio, supra note 37, at 97.
49 Id.
5o Stravitz, supra note 36, at 185 n.1.
51 Reggio, supra note 37, at 98.
52 Id.
53

Id

54 Id. (quoting HON. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZEL ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL [2:576-87.1, 2:597]).

ss Id.
56 Id.

57 Id
ss Id.
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D. MOTIONS TO REMAND TO STATE COURT
If a defendant considers all of the above-mentioned factors and decides to
remove a case to federal court, then the plaintiff typically files a motion to
remand the case to state court. The ensuing battle sometimes lasts years.59 The
delay helps defendants, buying more time to build their defense.60
Consequently, if a plaintiff files a case in a state court, the defendant oftentimes
removes the case to a federal court.
Statistics support the frequency and efficacy of removal.61 Removal transfers

about thirty thousand state court cases to federal courts in a year and generates
12% of the cases in federal courts. 62 Further, statistics show that plaintiffs' win
rate in federal court drops if the defendant removed the case from state court. 63
Hence, the battle of forum deserves the close attention of plaintiffs and
defendants.
III. REMOVAL OF COPYRIGHT-RELATED CASES AND THE COMPLETE
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE: THE DOCTRINE AND THE DEBATE

Defendants in cases that involve copyrights remove cases to federal court in
three circumstances.64 First, if the case presents a question of federal law, then
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) allows the defendant to remove the case to federal
court. 65 Second, if the case involves parties who reside in different states, 28
U.S.C. § 1441 allows the defendant to remove the case. Third, if the plaintiff
presents state law claims that the Copyright Act completely preempts, then the
doctrine of complete preemption allows the defendant to remove the case to
federal court.66
A. COMPLETE PREEMPTION VERSUS ORDINARY PREEMPTION

1. Ordinary Preemption. Ordinary preemption refers to a defense.67 When a
plaintiff files a lawsuit that includes a state law claim, ordinary preemption

s9 Barber, supra note 42, at 1558.
60 Id
61 Carol E. Heckman, Removaljurisdiedon:A Trapfor the Unwary: Outside Counsel, N.Y. L.J., Sept.

11, 2000, at 1
62 Id
63 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 593.

- 28 U.S.C. 5 1441 (a)-(d); Briarpatch,373 F.3d at 305.
65 28 U.S.C. ( 1441 (a)-(b).
66 Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cit. 2004).
67 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 11.
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authorizes the defendant to assert in defense that the state law conflicts'with a
federal law.68 If the court agrees, it dismisses the state law claim.69
2. Two Types of OrdinaryPreemption EXist.7o "Express preemption" means that
a federal statute states that it overrides similar state laws.7'
"Implied
preemption" signifies that the federal law does not plainly say that it overrides
similar state laws.72 Both express preemption and implied preemption provide
defenses to a defendant,73 but they do not allow a defendant to remove a case in
a state court to a federal court. 74
3. Complete Preemption. Complete preemption, however, empowers a
defendant to remove a case from state court to federal court.75 The removal
statute generally allows a defendant to transfer a case from state court to a
federal court if it raises a federal claim76--the "well-pleaded" complaint rule
provides that the plaintiffs complaint must expressly present a federal question
to allow the defendant to remove the case. Thus, a plaintiff who files a lawsuit
that relies exclusively on state law generally prevents removal of the case. 77 The
doctrine of complete preemption, however, provides an exception or corollary
to this rule.78 If the complaint includes a state law claim and a federal statute
extraordinarily broadly covers the subject matter of the state law claim, then the
doctrine allows the defendant to remove the entire lawsuit to a federal court.79
The doctrine essentially converts the state law complaint into a complaint that
states a question of federal law."

68 See 14B id. ("[PIreemption ordinarily cannot serve as a basis for removal because it is raised
as a defense.").
69 See id. ("If a plaintiff's state law claim is deemed preempted by federal law, the state law

claim is simply dismissed.").
70 See Elizabeth Helmer, The Ever-Expanding Complete Preemption Doctrine and the Copyrght Act: Is
This What Congress Really Wanted?, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 205, 207 (2005) ("A claim may be
preempted expressly or impliedly.'".
71 Id.
72 Jd
73 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 11,

74

5 3722.2.

14B id.

75 Boarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305.
76 28 U.S.C. 5 1441(a).
77 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 11, § 3722.2.
78 Paul E. McGreal, In Defense of Complete Preemption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 147, 147-

48 (2007).
79 See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6-8 (2003) (holding that "a state claim
may be removed to federal court ... when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of
action through complete pre-emption").
80 DowD, supra note 38, § 10:6.
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First, a federal statute must extraordinarily broadly cover a field of federal
law. If a court determines that this is the case, then the court assesses whether
the federal statute covers the subject matter of the state law claim.
B. COMPLETE PREEMPTION TESTS

To assess whether a federal statute extraordinarily broadly covers a field of
federal law, courts apply one of two tests: the "congressional intent" test8' or
the "exclusive federal cause of action" test.82
1. The CongressionalIntent Test. In Metropolitan Lfe Insurance Co. v. Taylor, the
Supreme Court created the congressional intent test.83 Under the test, a federal
statute extraordinarily broadly covers a field of federal law if "Congress has
clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope .. . [of
the statute] removable to federal court."8
2. The Exclusive FederalCause ofAction Test. Several years later, in Beneficial
NationalBank v. Anderson, the Supreme Court created the exclusive federal cause
of action test.85 The test provides that a federal statute extraordinarily broadly
covers a field of federal law if the "federal statute .. . both preempts state law
and substitutes a federal remedy for that law, thereby creating an exclusive
federal cause of action."6 Although the Court decided Anderson in 2003 and
Taylor in 1987, some courts still apply the earlier Taylor test of congressional
intent.87
3. The Results of the Tests. If a defendant removes a case in a state court to a
federal court and asserts that the doctrine of complete preemption allows him
to remove the case because a federal statute extraordinarily broadly covers a
state law claim, then the federal district court applies one of the two tests to
determine if the complete preemption doctrine applies to the statute. The
Supreme Court has decided that the doctrine applies to the Labor Management
Relations Act,88 the Employee Retirement Security Act,89 and the National Bank
81 See Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 63-64 (holding that "Congress may so completely pre-empt a
particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal").
82 See Beneficial Nat'! Bank, 539 U.S. at 8 ("[WJhere this Court has found complete
preemption ... the federal statutes at issue provided the exclusive cause of action for this claim
asserted and also set forth procedures and remedies governing that cause of action.").
83 Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 61-67.

8

Id. at 66.

Beneficial Nat'lBank, 539 U.S. at 8-11.
Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004).
87 See, e.g., Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying the
"congressional intent" test); NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB-JMA, 2012 WL
2498868 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (applying the "congressional intent" test).
88 Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390
85
86
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Act.90 The courts of appeals and district courts have applied the two tests and
decided that the doctrine applies to some additional statutes and not others.9'
a. The Complete Preemption DoctrineApplies. Some courts of appeals have
held the doctrine applies to the following statutes: the Bankruptcy Code; the
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act; the Federal
Communications Act; the Federal Railroad Safety Act; the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act; the Railway Labor Act;
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act; the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act; and the
Copyright Act.92
b. The Complete Preemption Doctrine Does Not Apply. Conversely, some
courts of appeal have held that the complete preemption doctrine does not
apply to the following statutes: the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act; the Federal Communications Act; the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Lanham Act; the National
Labor Relations Act; and the Copyright Act.93 The Second, Fourth, and Sixth
Circuits have held that the complete preemption doctrine applies to the
Copyright Act, but the Third Circuit has held that the doctrine does not.9 4
C. THE DEBATE OVER COMPLETE PREEMPTION

Courts and scholars disagree on many aspects of the complete preemption
doctrine in general and the doctrine in the copyright context in particular.
Some scholars and judges dislike the doctrine as a whole or one of the tests in
particular, while other scholars and judges accept the doctrine and one of the
tests. In the copyright context, commentators disagree, while three circuits
apply the doctrine to the Copyright Act and one circuit does not.95
U.S. 557, 560 (1968).

89

Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987).
90 Benefidal Nat'lBank, 539 U.S. at 10-11.
9114B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,supra note 11, § 3722.2.
92 14B id.

93 14B id.
94 See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding the
complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1
F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cit. 1993) (finding the complete preemption doctrine applies to the
Copyright Act); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 (6th Cit. 2005) (finding the complete
preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act); Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Tombs, 215 F.
App'x 8, 82 (3d Cit. 2006) (finding the complete preemption doctrine does not apply to the
Copyright Act).
9s See Helmer, supra note 70, at 229-31 (arguing that applying the doctrine is eroding
federalism); David Ratner, The Ongoing Stggle to Determine Federal 'Atising Under" Jrisdiction in
Copyright: The Compkte Preemption Excepdon to the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule, 84 DENV. U. L. REv.
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Moreover, the four circuits used different tests to determine whether the
complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act-two circuits96

applied the congressional intent test, and two circuits97 applied the exclusive
federal cause of action test-which leaves courts in the remaining circuits with a
split of persuasive authority on which test to apply and whether the doctrine
applies to the Copyright Act.
Courts and practitioners in most circuits face a problem: does the complete
The arguments of
preemption doctrine apply to the Copyright Act?
commentators and judges provide practitioners with the tools to advocate either
that the doctrine applies to the Copyright Act or that it does not. A defendant
who seeks to remove a case on the grounds that the complete preemption
doctrine applies to the Copyright Act needs to show (1) that the complete
preemption doctrine as a whole rests on solid footing, (2) that one of the tests
best animates the doctrine, and (3) that the chosen test shows that the doctrine
applies to the Copyright Act.98 Conversely, a plaintiff who seeks to remand a
case to state court needs to show (1) that the doctrine rests on shaky footing,
(2) that neither test functions, and that that even if the court still applies the
tests, the doctrine does not apply to the Copyright Act.99
1. Perspectives on Complete Preemption in General. Competing theories explain
the legal basis for the complete preemption doctrine.
Judges and commentators disagree on the language of complete preemption.
Under one perspective, the complete preemption doctrine provides an
"exception"100 to the well-pleaded complaint rule-the well-pleaded complaint
rule allows the defendant to remove a case only if the complaint plainly asserts a
question of federal law.101 Under this perspective, the complete preemption
doctrine provides an unwarranted exception to the long-standing rule that a
defendant cannot remove a case that merely asserts state law claims.102 Under
955, 974-76 (2006) (arguing that applying the doctrine is supporting federalism); see also Briarpatch,
373 F.3d at 305 (applying the doctrine); Roscistewski, I F.3d at 232-33 (applying the doctrine);
Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287 (applying the doctrine); Tombs, 215 F. App'x at 82 (declining to apply the
doctrine).
96 See Roscistewsks, 1 F.3d at 232-33; Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 286-87.
9 See Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305; Tombs, 215 F. App'x at 82.
98 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that the
complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act).
9 See, e.g., Crooks v. Certified Computer Consultants, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 582, 587 (W.D. La.
2000) (finding that the complete preemption doctrine does not apply to the Copyright Act).
100 Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 549 ("The complete preemption doctrine is an exception to the
[well-pleaded complaint] rule.'); Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011)
(finding the complete preemption doctrine is an "exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule").
3722.2.
101 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 11,
102 Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 569.
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another perspective, the doctrine provides a "corollary"103 to the well-pleaded
complaint rule-that is, the doctrine merely "recharacterizes" state law claims
as federal law claims if a federal statute broadly covers the subject matter.04
Although most perspectives address a particular test-the congressional
intent test or the exclusive federal cause of action test-some perspectives
address the doctrine as a whole. For instance, in one view, "Congress would do
well to eliminate a doctrine that is contrary to sound jurisdictional theory,
exceedingly difficult to apply, and the bane of judges and litigants alike."s05 In
another view, however, the doctrine rests on a solid rationale: it "unmask[s]
federal claims masquerading as state ones."'06
2. Perspectiveson the Tests.
a. Views on the Congressional Intent Test. Although the Supreme Court
created the exclusive federal cause of action test in 2003, some courts continue
to apply the older congressional intent test. Few commentators, however,
praise the congressional intent test. One scholar who favors the test asserted
that it ensures that only a narrow class of situations constitute exceptions to the
well-pleaded complaint rule, since the test requires that the court find that
Congress intended to allow defendants to remove claims in the subject matter
of the federal statute. 07
Most views, however, criticize the congressional intent test for several
reasons. 08 One view holds that the Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing
the congressional intent test sends "conflicting signals"09 on the scope of the
complete preemption doctrine and lacks a "principled analysis,""o which creates
confusion and different interpretations in the lower courts.", The Supreme
Court ostensibly failed to provide a systematic rationale and thus deprived the
lower courts of comprehensible precedent.112 Further, the Court failed to
evaluate the complete set of values that applies to removal, caused lower courts
03 See, e.g., Melchor v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00339 AWIGS, 2012 WL
1836289 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2012) (finding that "[c]omplete preemption ... is a corollary to the
well-pleaded complaint rule").
104 McGreal, supra note 12, at 148.
105 Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering theArfulPleading Doctrine, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 273, 335 (1993).
10 Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective jurisdition, Foreign Affairs Removal and Complete
Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 1775, 1814 (2007).
107 Helmer, supra note 70, at 230.
108 Karen A. Jordan, The Complete PreemptionDilemma:A Legal ProcessPerspective, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 927, 928 (1996); Tristin K. Green, Complete Preemption-Removing the Mysteg from Removal,
86 CALIF. L. REv. 363, 376 (1998).
10 Jordan, supra note 108, at 928.

110 Id. at 929.

111Id. at 928-29; Green, supra note 108, at 376.
112 Jordan, supra note 108, at 964.
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to inconsistently apply the law, and prevented a principled perspective of the
doctrine.H3 Consequently, many lower courts oversimplified the doctrine.114 In
short, although the Supreme Court stated that the test inquires into
congressional intent, some commentators assert that the test did not help lower
courts because the Court did not specify the amount of intent.115 Thus, courts
too often allow removal, which increases the caseload of the federal court
system and thereby reduces the quality of its output."6
b. Views on the Exclusive Federal Cause of Acion Test. Consequently, some
commentators prefer the exclusive federal cause of action test. Defenders of
this test assert that it more clearly defines the complete preemption doctrine."7
The test requires that the federal statute expressly preempt state laws and
substitute a federal remedy for that law. This arguably balances the wellpleaded complaint rule and ensures that plaintiffs do not improperly keep
certain cases out of federal court.118 One supporter of the test argues that
federal courts should decide some types of claims and that the test "makes
things simpler, faster, [and] more efficient."1
Defender of the test claims that it benefits judicial economy and litigant
resources.120 Another supporter claims that the test brings "clarity to the
[complete preemption] doctrine."121 Moreover, the fact that the test limits
complete preemption to federal statutes that provide a federal remedy arguably
maintains the general quality of the federal courts.122
However, many criticize the test. Justice Scalia authored a dissent in
BenefialNaionalBankv. Anderson, where the court created the test. He asserted
that the test does not justify an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule
and called the complete preemption doctrine a "federalize-and-remove
dance."o1n Other critics disapprove of the fact that the test permits removal "in
any circumstance in which federal law provides someone a cause of action and
113

Id

Green, supra note 108, at 379.
Oleksandra Johnson, The Bankrupty Code as Complete Preemption: The Ulimate Trump?, 81 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 31, 58 (2007).
116 Moss, supra note 26, at 1638.
117 See, e.g., Garrick B. Pursley, RaionaligingComplete PreemptionAfter Beneficial National Bank v.
Anderson: A New Rule, A New justfication, 54 DRAKE L. REv. 371 (2006) (asserting that the
exclusive federal cause of action test "rehabilitates the hopelessly muddled complete preemption
doctrine").
118 McGreal, supra note 12, at 149.
119 Pursley, supra note 117, at 432.
114
115

120

Id

121

Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 548.
Moss, supra note 26, at 1639.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 18 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

122
123
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also precludes state law causes of action."124 Still, others maintain that the test
raises concerns because it expands federal jurisdiction and does not require
"express congressional authorization."125 Thus, the test fails to respect the
autonomy of state courts and the tradition that only Congress has the power to
limit this autonomy.126
Other perspectives assert that the exclusive federal cause of action test lacks
a rationale.127 Under one view, the test lacks a coherent theory because the
Supreme Court did not heed the basic principles that underlie federal question
jurisdiction-that is, the "relationship between preemption, federal jurisdiction,
and the interest in a uniform interpretation of federal law."128 Moreover, the
test arguably lacks a rationale that addresses litigants' need to avoid state courts
in some instances in order to "sidestep" state court bias.129 Another view
asserts that the test fails to explain why an exclusive federal cause of action
triggers complete preemption.130
Further, some commentators attack the mechanics of the exclusive federal
cause of action test. 3' Under this view, the test needs a criterion that expressly
requires a "full substantive analysis to determine jurisdiction." As is, the test
arguably impedes judicial efficiency.132 Detractors argue that the test lacks
predictability and needlessly moves cases between state and federal courts.133
c. Improvements to the Tests. Naturally, scholars have suggested numerous
ways to improve both the congressional intent test and the exclusive federal
cause of action test. One scholar suggests amending the congressional intent
test to allow complete preemption if the plaintiff attempts to manipulate the
language in the state court complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction34 Under
another perspective, the congressional intent test simply needs a predictable,
understandable, and usable framework.135

124 Miles v. Okun, 430 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result).
125 Johnson, supra note 115, at 61.
126 Young, supra note 106, at 1819; BenefidalNat'lBank,539 U.S. at 11-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 See Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 549; Morrison, supra note 18, at 189.
128 Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 549.
129 Id. at 554.
130 Morrison, supra note 18, at 189.
131 See, e.g., Margaret Tarkington, Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and CongressionalIntent
After Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 59 S.C. L. REV. 225, 275 (2008).
132

Id

Id. at 294.
Moss, supra note 26, at 1602.
A. Mark Segreti, The Federal Preemption Question-A Federal Question? An Analysis of Federal
JurisdictionOver Supremacy Clause Issues, 33 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 653, 657 (1984).
133

134
135
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Similarly, the exclusive federal cause of action test arguably needs a bright
line rule too. One perspective asserts that the exclusive federal cause of action
test needs to limit complete preemption to situations in which the federal
government has a strong interest in legislative uniformity.136
3. Complete Preemption and the Copynght Act. Four circuits have already
addressed whether the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright
Act; district courts in the remaining circuits need to decide whether to apply the
congressional intent test or the exclusive federal cause of action test to
determine if the doctrine applies to the Copyright Act, if they believe that the
doctrine rests on solid footing.137 For example, the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico, located in the Tenth circuit, did not apply
either test to the Copyright Act because the court rejected the doctrine on the
grounds that the doctrine did not rest on solid footing.138

a. The Congressional Intent Test and the Copyrght Act. The Congressional
intent test causes a number of different outcomes in the copyright context. For
example, in Rosds!ewski v. Arete Assodates, the Fourth Circuit applied the
congressional intent test.139 The Court decided that Congress intended the
Copyright Act to completely preempt state law claims because "Congress
employed a broad mandatory preemption provision for causes of action
equivalent to copyright claims" in section 301(a)140 of the Copyright Act and
because Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction over copyright claims to the
federal district courts in 28 U.S.C. 5 1338(a).141 Thus, the Court applied the
complete preemption doctrine to the Copyright Act.142 Conversely, in American
Airlines Inc. v. BiZtraveldeals.com, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, located in the Fifth Circuit, applied the congressional intent

136 Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 573.
137 Roscisewski, 1 F.3d at 232-33; Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 286-87; Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305; Tombs,

215 F. App'x at 82.
138 Black v. Kos, No. 05-163, 2005 WL 4564587, at *1 (D.N.M. Mar. 29, 2005).
139 Roscis.ewski, 1 F.3d at 232.
140 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006) ("On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created
before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this
title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.").
141 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks . . . .").
142

RoscisZewski, 1 F.3d at 233.
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test but disagreed with the analysis in Roscistewski.143 The court held that
§§ 1338(a) and 301(a) did not prove congressional intent to allow complete
preemption in the Copyright Act context.144
b. The Exclusive FederalCause ofAction Test and the CopyrghtAct. Similarly,
the exclusive federal cause of action test leads to varying results. In Briarpatch
Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures,Inc., the Second Circuit applied the exclusive federal cause
of action test, which requires that the court find that the federal statute "both
preempts state law and substitutes a federal remedy for that law, thereby
creating an exclusive federal cause of action."l45 The Second Circuit decided
that the Copyright Act creates an exclusive cause of action because the Act
"lays out the elements, statute of limitations, and remedies for copyright
infringement."146 Conversely, in Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Tombs, the Third
Circuit applied the exclusive federal cause of action test and found that the
Copyright Act did not provide an exclusive remedy.147
c. The Two-Prong Test of Subject Matter and GeneralScope. If the court applies
either the congressional intent test or the exclusive federal cause of action test
and decides that that test shows the Copyright Act so completely covers the
field of copyright law that the complete preemption doctrine applies, then the
court applies yet another test.148 This test consists of two prongs and
determines whether the Copyright Act covers the specific subject matter of the
plaintiffs state claim.149 "The first prong of the [two-part] test is known as the
'subject matter requirement,' and the second prong is known as the 'general
scope requirement.' "150 If the court finds that the two-part test shows that the
Copyright Act does cover the specific subject matter of the state law claim, then
the court holds that the defendant properly removed the case to federal court
and denies the defendant's motion to remand.151
The subject matter prong "is satisfied if a work fits within the general
subject matter of 55 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act, regardless of whether it
qualifies for copyright protection."152 Specifically, the court must determine

143

No. 4:08-CV-069-A, 2008 WL 818536, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).

144

Id

145

Briarpatch,373 F.3d at 305.

146

Id

147
148

Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Tombs, 215 F. App'x 80, 82 (3d Cir. 2006).
DowD, supra note 38, § 10:5.

149

Id

Id. (quotingBiarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305).
Id
Stanford v. Caesars Entm't, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 749, 755 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (quoting
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 300 (6th Cir. 2004)).
150
151
152
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whether the Plaintiffs state law claim involves any of the following types of
material:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

literary works;
musical works, including any accompanying words;
dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
pantomimes and choreographic works;
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
sound recordings;
architectural works; [or]
compilations or collections [of the above types of works].153

In the second prong, the court assesses whether the state law right "is
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights under 5 106 of the Copyright Act."M
Section 106 grants copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, derive,
distribute, perform, and display copyrighted works.'ss Courts apply the "extra
element test" to determine if the state law right "is equivalent" to any of these
rights.156 In the extra element test, the court "must examine the elements of the
state law claim":157
[I]f an extra element is required instead of or in addition to the
acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display in
order to constitute a state-created cause of action ... [and] the
extra element changes the nature of the action so that it is
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim, [then
the state right in the state law claim] "is [not] equivalent" [to the
rights in the Copyright Act].158

In sum, if the court finds that the state law claim involves the same type of
material in §§ 102 and 103 and finds that the state law claim requires proof of
the same elements without requiring extra elements, then the court holds that

153
154

DowD, supra note 38, § 10.7; 17 U.S.C.
Stomback, 384 F.3d at 301.

$

102-103 (2006).

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Stanford, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 757-58.
157 Chris-Leef Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Rising Star Ins. Inc., No. 11-cv-2409-JAR, 2011 WL
5039141, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2011).
158 Stanford, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (quoting Stromback, 384 F.3d at 301).
155
156
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the Copyright Act covers the general subject matter of the state law claim and
159
the defendant properly removed the state court case to federal court.
d. The Results of the Two-Prong Test. The results of the two-prong test are
unpredictable.o60 Courts have applied the two-prong test to several state law
claims.161 In some cases courts have found that the Copyright Act completely
preempts and allows removal of the following state law claims:
[B]reach of implied contract, tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, deceptive
trade practices, unjust enrichment/misappropriation/unfair
competition, negligent failure to acknowledge one work is based
on another, conversion,. . . declaration of ownership of rights in
a work, a claim for slander of title based on allegations of
ownership,. . . a right of publicity claim over use of a fictional
character.162
Conversely, in other cases, courts have applied the two-prong test and held that
the Copyright Act does not completely preempt and therefore does not allow
removal of the following state law claims:
[B]reach of contract, tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage, fraud and civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of a confidential relationship, promissory estoppel,
deceptive trade practices, misrepresentation, failure to pay royalties
or to account for profits earned by a co-owner of the copyright,
unfair competition/unjust enrichment/misappropriation, trade
secret misappropriation, right of privacy, right of publicity,
defamation, and conversion.163

1' DowD, supra note 38, § 10.6.
16o See, e.g., Patrick v. Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481, 484 (W.D. N.Y. 1995) (applying the two-prong
test and finding that the Copyright Act preempted a conversional claim); County of Del. v. Gov't
Sys., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601-02 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (applying the two-prong test and finding
that the Copyright Act did not preempt a conversion claim).
161 See, e.g., Krueger v. Tradeguider Sys., LLC, No. 07 C 6261, 2007 WL 4219194 (N.D. Ill. 2007
Nov. 27, 2007) (applying the two-prong test to a breach of contract claim); Firoozye v. Earthlink
Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (applying the two-prong test to a misrepresentation
claim); Tavormina v. Evening Star Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 729 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (applying the
two-prong test to an unjust enrichment claim).
162 5 PATRY, supra note 44, at 17-75 to -77 (citations omitted).
163 5 id. at 17-73 to -75 (citations omitted).
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e. Views on Complete Preemption in the Copynight Act Context. Critics of the
complete preemption doctrine in the copyright context assert a number of
views. Some commentators assert that complete preemption in the copyright
context often leaves the plaintiff without a remedy.164 Others argue that
Congress expressly provided for removal in various statutes but not in the
Copyright Act because Congress did not intend to extend complete preemption
to the Copyright Act.16s Further, some scholars criticize the extra element test;
they assert that courts misconstrue the test and overlook the elements and
instead scrutinize the underlying facts and wrongly assess if the facts give rise to
a copyright claim.166 The Sixth Circuit has further identified additional
problems with the extra element test:
The problem with this test is that it does not provide any real
guidance to the courts. There is always some difference between
the state law and the Copyright Act, so a court that wants to
avoid preemption can always find some difference, however
small, that is the 'extra element' needed to avoid preemption.167
A few scholars, however, defend complete preemption in the copyright
context. For example, under one view the complete preemption doctrine
provides a reasonable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Indeed, in
the copyright context, parties often assign and license rights in contracts, and
the circumstances often involve significant federal interests.168
Commentators also offer various suggestions to improve the doctrine in the
copyright context. In one view, courts simply need to rigorously apply the extra
element test and focus on the elements of the state law cause of action, rather
than the underlying facts.169 Moreover, the doctrine arguably needs a stronger
standard to ensure that courts do not override the traditional values of
jurisdiction.170

Helmer, supra note 70, at 217.
Amy J. Everhart, Ritchie v. Williams and the Complete Preemption Doctine in Copyrght: The New
Federal/StateDebate, 42 TENN. B.J. 18, 22 (2006).
166 Helmer, supranote 70, at 209; see also Chris-Leef General Agency, Inc. v. Rising Star Ins. Inc.,
No. 11-cv-2409-JAR, 2011 WL 5039141, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2011) ("[A] defendant 'takes the
wrong approach by focusing its preemption analysis on the conduct alleged'. . . the Court must
'compare the elements of the causes of action, not the facts pled to prove them.'" (quoting
Harolds Stores v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 82 F.3d 1533, 1543 (10th Cit. 1996))).
167 Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 291 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schuyler Moore, Straightening
Out Copyrght Preemption,9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 201, 204 (2002)).
164
165

168

Id

169 Helmer, supra note 70, at 228.
170 Id at 210.
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IV. NTDARCHITECTS V.BAKER
Applying the complete preemption doctrine in the copyright context
presents a complex set of questions, and the recent case of NTD Architects v.
Baker provides a rich background for evaluating the mechanics of the interplay
of the doctrine and Copyright Act.'1'
A. BACKGROUND
In August 2011, NTD Architects, an architectural firm in San Diego, sued
two former employee architects in San Diego Superior Court.172 In May 2011,
Baker and Nowicki had formed their own architectural firm, Baker Nowicki
Design Studio, and started to compete with NTD Architects.173 Both firms
provided design services to large commercial development projects such as
public schools.174 In state court, NTD Architects asserted that Baker and
Nowicki stole property of NTD Architects when the two architects left NTD
Architects to start Baker Nowicki Design Studio.15 Specifically, NTD
Architects claimed that Baker and Nowicki stole photographs, drawings,
computer files, project tracking forms, marketing plans, funding calculation
forms, renderings, meeting minutes, models, documents, external computer
drives, trade secrets, and a laptop computer. 7 6
The complaint alleged eight causes of action under state law.7 Specifically,
NTD Architects alleged breach of trust, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty,
misappropriation of trade secrets, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of a
Nowicki employment contract, and breach of a Baker employment contract. 78
In December 2011, NTD Architects filed a second lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California against Baker and
Nowicki.179 The complaint alleged the same underlying facts as the August 2011
complaint and asserted two cases of action: copyright infringement and false
advertising.1so In January 2012, Baker and Nowicki removed the earlier case
'71

NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB-JMA, 2012 WL 2498868, at *1-8 (S.D. Cal.

June 27, 2012).
172 Id. at*1.
'7 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id
177 Id
178 Id
179 Id
180 Id.
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from the San Diego Superior Court to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California on the grounds that the case involved copyrightprotected materials and raised issues of federal copyright law.181 In response,
NTD Architects filed a motion to remand the case to state court. 182
In the motion to remand, NTD Architects asserted that the state court
complaint did not present questions of federal law and thus that the federal
court did not have jurisdiction.183

Although NTD Architects noted that

copyright law protected some of the stolen materials, its motion to remand
stated, "[t]his case has no business in federal court. Plaintiffs State Court
Complaint is not a complaint based on copyright infringement, nor does it
allege a cause of action for copyright infringement."184
Baker and Nowicki opposed the motion to remand,185 arguing that the state
court complaint did raise federal questions.186 Baker and Nowicki claimed that
NTD Architect's motion to remand ignored the complete preemption doctrine
and that the doctrine applied to the Copyright Act.187 Baker and Nowicki then
described the two-prong test and argued that the state law claims satisfied the
first prong of the test because NTD Architects admitted that copyright law
covered the type of materials in the complaint.88 Baker and Nowicki then
asserted that several of the claims satisfied the second part of the test. 18 9 For
example, Baker and Nowicki applied the extra element test to the conversion
claim, then asserted that a conversion claim and a copyright claim of
unauthorized reproduction have the same elements because both assert that the
defendant unlawfully reproduced material.19o
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California first
considered the complete preemption doctrine in the context of the Copyright
Act.191 The court noted that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear federal
question cases and that the complete preemption doctrine provides a
181 Id at *2.
182 Id
183 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Point and Authorities in Support of Motion to Remand to State

Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) at 1-2, NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB(S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012).
18 Id. at 1.
185 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Remand to State Court Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1147(c), NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB-JMA at 1-22 (S.D. Cal. Feb.
22, 2012).
186 Id. at 9-10.
187 Id. at 10-12.
188 Id. at 12-14.
189 Id. at 14-19.

JMA

1990
Id.
191 NTD Arehitects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *4.
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"corollary" that allows federal courts to also hear cases that involve state law.192
However, the complete preemption doctrine applies to only a "handful" of
statutes. 193 The court identified two Supreme Court cases in which the Court.
focused on the intent of Congress as its basis for extending the complete
preemption doctrine to the Labor Management Relations Act and the
Employee Retirement Security Act.194 The Southern District of California court
also found "[i]n evaluating whether ... the Copyright Act qualifies . . . the
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rosdstemski v.
Arete Associates. . . [was] particularly instructive,"195 especially as it too focused
on the intent of Congress when it extended complete preemption to the
Copyright Act.196

The Fourth Circuit in Rosispweski focused on two statutory provisions to
evaluate congressional intent.197 The court stated, "[i]n the Fourth Circuit's
view, two statutory provisions demonstrated Congress's intent to completely
preempt state copyright law: the Act's preemption provision, 17 U.S.C. 5 301(a),
and the jurisdictional statute relating to copyright actions, 28 U.S.C.
5 1338(a)."198 First, the court followed the analysis of the Fourth Circuit and
noted the broad nature of the preemption provision in 5 301(a).199 The court
agreed with the Rosdspyeski court that the broad nature of the provision showed
that "Congress has clearly indicated that state law claims which come within the
subject matter of copyright law and which protect rights equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright law . .. should be
litigated only as federal copyright claims."200 Second, the court considered
§ 1338(a) and agreed with the Fourth Circuit that "the grant of exclusive
original jurisdiction over copyright claims to the district courts [provides] strong
evidence that Congress intended copyright litigation to take place in federal
courts."201 Thus, the court concluded that the complete doctrine applied to the
Copyright Act.202

192

Id

193 Id
194
195
196

Id
Id
Id. at *5.

197 Id
198Id

199 Id
200 Id. (quoting Rosdsewski,
201
202

1 F.3d at 232).

Id
Id. at *6.
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Next, the court applied the two-prong test.203 First, the court determined
that the types of materials referred to by the complaint-the external hard
drives, trade secrets, and other materials-constituted the types of materials in
§§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act, which lists literary works and architectural
works, among others. The court held that the physical objects-the laptop
computer, external hard drives, and other objects-qualified as copyrighted
materials and that NTD Architects admitted that copyright protected the
materials.204 Thus, these materials in the complaint satisfied the first prong of
the test.205 Second, the court found that the extra element test showed that a
conversion claim required essentially the same elements.206 The court stated,
"[t]o state a claim for conversion under California law, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of a certain piece of property;
(2) the defendant's conversion of the property by a wrongful act or disposition
of property rights; and (3) damages."207 The court noted that "[t]o some degree,
a claim for conversion has an extra element beyond the Copyright Act, since the
plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant wrongfully obtained possession
over the specific piece of property."208 Nonetheless, the court ultimately
concluded that a claim of conversion did not require an extra element and that
"just one claim is sufficient to warrant removal"; the court ruled that the
remaining seven state law claims required an extra element.209
B. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION

The decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California to allow Baker and Nowicki to remove the case raises a number of
issues.
1. The Complete Preemption Dodrine. The court decided that the complete
preemption doctrine rests on solid footing, but other jurisdictions disagree.210
Although the court concluded that jurisprudence on the doctrine shows that it
applies to only a "handful" of statutes, the court determined that the doctrine
rests on sufficiently solid footing to apply to the Copyright Act.211 The court
cited two Supreme Court cases that additionally applied the doctrine to the
Id. at *-8.
24 Id.at *7.
203

206

Id
Id.at *1516.

207

Id at *8.

208

Id
Id

205

209
210
211

Id. at *4-6.
Id. at *4, *8.
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Labor Management Relations Act and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.212 In Black v. Kos, however, the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico declined to consider the complete preemption
doctrine in the context of the Copyright Act because "[t]he Supreme Court has
not spoken on the issue, nor has a clear consensus emerged among the
circuits."213 Thus, the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico did not apply the congressional intent test or the exclusive federal cause
of action test. 214 Moreover, one commentator who considered the complete
preemption doctrine stated, "Congress would do well to eliminate a doctrine
that is contrary to sound jurisdictional theory."215 Thus, the court potentially
leapt to an unjustified decision to consider the doctrine.
2. The Congressional Intent Test and the Exclusive Federal Cause of Action Test.
Courts apply either the congressional intent test or the exclusive federal cause
of action test.2 16 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California applied the congressional intent test without considering the
exclusive federal cause of action test.217 Although the district court noted the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Arco and Taylor, in which the Court created
the congressional intent test, the district court did not note the Supreme Court's
decision in Anderson, in which the Court created the exclusive federal cause of
action test. 218 The Court decided Taylor in 1987 and Anderson in 2003.219 Many
commentators assert that the Anderson decision overrides Taylor such that the
exclusive federal cause of action test supplants the congressional intent test.2 2
Nonetheless, among the four circuits where the Courts of Appeals have decided
whether the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act, only
three decisions occurred after 2003.22 One court still applied the congressional
intent test, but two courts adopted the exclusive federal cause of action test to
assess whether the complete preemption doctrine applied to the Copyright

212

Id

213

No. CIV 05-163, 2005 WL 4564587, at *2.

214

Id

Ragazzo, supra note 105, at 335.
NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB-JMA, 2012 WL 2498868, at '94-5 (S.D. Cal.
June 27, 2012).
217 See Mero. Life, 481 U.S. at 61-67; Beneficial NatlBank, 539 U.S. at 8-11.
218 Beneficial Nat'lBank, 539 U.S. at 8-11.
219 Id.; Talor,481 U.S. at 66-67.
220 See Tarkington, supra note 131, at 227; Helmer, supra note 70, at 220.
221 Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 286-87 (6th Cit. 2005); Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix
Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2 d Cir. 2004); Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Tombs, 215 F.
App'x 80, 82 (3d Cit. 2006).
215
216
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Act.m Further, in recent district court decisions, many courts have still applied
the congressional intent test.223
Nonetheless, the court arguably misapplied the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court in the area of complete preemption. The court did not
acknowledge the Anderson decision, which established the exclusive federal
cause of action test, and instead relied on the pre-Anderson RosisZewski decision,
where the Fourth Circuit utilized the congressional intent test to assess
complete preemption in the context of the Copyright Act.224 If the court
needed persuasive authority on complete preemption in the Copyright Act
context, then the decisions of the Second and Fifth Circuits in Briapatch and
Board of Chosen Freeholders provide recent post-Anderson analyses of complete
preemption and the Copyright Act, where the courts applied the exclusive
federal cause of action test.mn
Furthermore, although courts still apply the congressional intent test, many
commentators criticize the test.226 The decision of the NTD court to apply the
congressional intent test arguably creates a vague precedent because the test
does not specify the amount of congressional intent, lacks a systematic
rationale, and potentially increases the caseload of the federal courts. 227 Indeed,
in this case, the caseload of the federal courts increased because the court
denied the motion to remand.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the congressional intent test showed
that the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act, but the
court did not address counterarguments that the test does not show that the
complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act.228 For example, in
Bnarpatch, the Second 'Circuit stated, "[u]ntil the Supreme Court's recent
222 Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 286-87 (applying the federal cause of action test); Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at
305 (applying the exclusive federal cause of action test); Tombs, 215 F. App'x at 82 (applying the
exclusive federal cause of action test).
223 See Main & Assocs., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 776 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1277
(M.D. Ala. 2011).
224 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *4-5.
225 Bniarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305; Tombs, 215 F. App'x at 82.
226 See Jordan, supra note 108, at 964 ("The [Supreme] Court's failure to systematically engage in
reasoned elaboration has deprived the lower courts of understandable and guiding precedent.");
Green, supra note 108, at 379 ("While some circuits have salvaged a coherent doctrine of
complete preemption ... others have settled upon an overly-simplified understanding of
preemption as a basis for removal.").
227 See Johnson, supra note 115, at 58 (asserting that the congressional intent test did not help
lower court because the Supreme Court did not specify the amount of intent); Moss, supra note
26, at 1638 (asserting that the complete preemption doctrine increased the case load of federal
courts); Jordan, supra note 108, at 964 ("The [Supreme] Court's failure to systematically engage in
reasoned elaboration has deprived the lower courts of understandable and guiding precedent.").
228 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *5-6.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol20/iss1/3

28

Lindsay: Complete Preemption and Copyright: Toward a Successive Analysis

2012]

COMPLETE PREEMPTIONAND COPYRIGHT

71

decision in [Anderson] . . . we would have hesitated to extend the complete

preemption doctrine into the copyright field."229 The Second Circuit continued,
"[a]lthough the Fourth Circuit had extended the complete preemption doctrine
to ... the Copyright Act [in RoscisZewskz], the point was debatable."230 Thus, the
Second Circuit questioned the RosdsZewski decision and doubted that the
congressional intent test showed that the complete preemption doctrine applied
to the Copyright Act.231. In NTD, the court relied on Roscieweski, where the
Fourth Circuit applied the congressional intent test and found the doctrine
applied to the Copyright Act.232
The court did not consider
counterarguments. 233
Specifically, the court cited Roscieweski and asserted that 5 301(a) of the
Copyright Act suggested that Congress intended to allow the complete
preemption doctrine to apply to the Copyright Act,234 but other commentators
have disagreed with the NTD court by asserting that 5 301 does not evidence
congressional intent.235 For instance, in Cambridge Library Propernies,Ltd. v. W
Goebel PorgellanfabrikG.m.b.H. ' Co., Judge Cyr of the First Circuit of Appeals
wrote a dissenting opinion that raised the issue of complete preemption and
compared section 301(b) to the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA).236
The Supreme Court subsequently held that the complete preemption doctrine
applied to ERISA.237 Judge Cyr noted that 5 1144(a) of ERISA states that
ERISA "shall supersede. any and all State' laws."238 Conversely, § 301(b) of the
Copyright Act states that "[n]othing in [the Copyright Act] annuls. or limits any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State," which
suggests that Congress did not intend the Act to broadly cover state law claims
that tangentially relate to copyright law.239
Moreover, one commentator
asserted that Congress expressly included provisions on removal in other
statutes but did not include a provision on removal in the Copyright Act.240
3. The Two-Prong Test of Subject Matter and General Scope. The NTD Architects
court potentially made an unwarranted local leap as well in the first prong of the

9 Briarpatch,373 F.3d at 304.
230

Id
Id
232 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *4-6; RosdsZewski, 1 F.3d at 231-33.
233 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *4-6.
234 Id. at *5.
235 See, e.g., Everhart,supra note 165, at 22.
236 Cambridge Literag,510 F.3d 92-103.
237 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987).
238 Cambridge Literag, 510 F.3d at 100; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
239 Cambridge Literag, 510 F.3d at 100; 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2006).
240 Everhart, supra note 165, at 22.
231
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two-prong test. The court concluded that 5§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act
cover the types of materials in the state court complaint-computer files,
external hard drives, and other materials.241 However, the court did not
describe the nature of the files or the contents of the hard drives.242
Similarly, in the second prong of the two-prong test, the court provided a
somewhat vague analysis of the extra element test. 243 The court observed that
"[tlo some degree[] a claim for conversion has an extra element beyond the
Copyright Act[] since the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant
wrongfully obtained possession over the specific piece of property."244
However, the court paradoxically concluded that a conversion claim does not
contain an extra element.245 This reasoning lacks consistency. While some
cases find that conversion contains an extra element,246 and others do not,247 the
court did not consider any of these cases. Moreover, the court allowed Baker
and Nowicki to remove their case to federal court on the slimmest of
margins-the court found that each of the other seven claims contained an
extra element.248
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The VTD Architects decision in particular .and the jurisprudence of the
complete preemption doctrine in the copyright context in general leave many
unanswered questions. First, the District Court for the Southern District of
California did not explain why seven of NTD Architects' claims contained an
extra element, and the omission glares because the court granted removal of the
entire case on the ground that the one claim of conversion did not contain an
extra element.249 Why. does a breach of contract claim contain an extra element?
Why does a misappropriation of trade secrets claim contain an extra element?
The NTD Architects court noted that some courts find that a breach of contract

241

NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *7.

242

Id

243
244

Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *8.

245

Id

E.g., Asunto v. Shoup, 132 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452-53 (E.D. La. 2000) (finding that a
conversion claim contains an extra element); County of Del. v. Gov't Sys., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d
592, 601-02 (finding that a conversion claim contains an extra element).
247 See Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 992 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that a conversion claim
does not contain an extra element); Patrick v. Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481, 484 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding that a conversion claim does not contain an extra element).
248 NTD Architects, 2012 WL 2498868, at *8.
246

249

Id
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claim contains an extra element,250 and it declined to consider decisions where
courts found that a breach of contract claim does not contain an extra element.
Practitioners ought to look to these cases to bolster their arguments.
Second, the NTD Architects court did not acknowledge the exclusive federal
cause of action test and offers no guidance on this opinion. Practitioners ought
to argue that one test applies and shows that the complete preemption doctrine
extends or does not extend to the Copyright Act.
Third, the NTC Architects court concluded that 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) and 28
U.S.C. 1338(a) show that Congress intended to allow the complete preemption
doctrine to apply to the Copyright Act,251 but the court did not consider that
5 301(b) states "[n]othing in ... [the Copyright Act] annuls or limits any rights
or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State."252 Congress
limited the scope of the Copyright Act in 5 301(b).253 Section 301(b) helps
practitioners who seek to argue that Congress did not intend the Copyright Act
to cover state law claims that barely relate to copyright law-that is, Congress
did not intend the complete preemption doctrine to apply to the Copyright Act.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although NTD Architects v. Baker leaves many unanswered questions, the
case highlights the fact that plaintiffs prefer state courts and defendants prefer
federal courts. It also illustrates that practitioners capable of arguing the pros
and cons of the complete preemption doctrine in general, and the doctrine in
the copyright context in particular, enjoy greater success in removing a case to
federal court or remanding a case to state court. NTD Architects filed their
case in state court and presumably felt more comfortable in that venue. The
architectural firm perhaps hoped to avoid the bias of federal courts, which
often favor defendants. Naturally, Baker and Nowicki transferred the case to
federal court, as statistics show that defendants fare better in federal court.254
Although the District Court for the Southern District of California held that the
complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act,255 many
commentators dislike the complete preemption doctrine either as a whole or
one of its two tests, while others argue that the doctrine simply does not apply

Id.
Id. at *5.
252 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2006).
253 Id.
254 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 593.
255 NTD Architects v. Baker, No. 12-CV-0020-AJB-JMA, 2012 WL 2498868, at *6-8 (S.D. Cal.
June 27, 2012).
250

251
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in the copyright context. 256 Informed practitioners use these competing
perspectives to bolster their arguments.
In most circuits, courts grapple to apply or reject the complete preemption
doctrine in the copyright context. 257 Thus, the analysis of the decision in 'TD
Architects empowers practitioners and courts to evaluate the doctrine. The
complete preemption doctrine in general, the congressional intent test, the
exclusive federal cause of action test, and the two-prong test each provide
separate fora of battle.

256 See Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 54849; Morrison, supra note 18, at 186-94; Helmer, supra note
70, at 223-29. .
257 See, e.g., Chris-Leef Gen. Agency v. Rising Star Ins., No. 11-cv-240 9 -JAR, 2011 WL 5039141,
at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2011) (observing that "most district courts within the Tenth Circuit
inconsistently apply the [complete preemption] doctrine to the Copyright Act").
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